The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations, 2012 (CORE1201)

Summary: The study creates a supply chain security framework that can be adapted on assessing how security management measures affect on safety and customs clearance performance in container shipping firms. Security management interventions are clustered in four categories: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. Findings indicated that container shipping firms that mainly focus on facility and cargo management and less on partner relationship management are generally more dissatisfied with their company’s customs clearance performance than companies that prioritize partnerships with governmental and commercial companies. The governmental agencies and commercial actors can employ supply chain security management framework, its attributes and dimensions in order to assess the supply chain security performance of container shipping firms.  The reviewed document is available at: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review:  Several authors have clustered supply chain security measures into different categories, but only few authors have provided statistical models to test how well these categories can be used to assess benefits of security measures. The study establishes four security categories/dimensions: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. The results imply that partner relationship management is positively related to customs clearance performance. Further, information management and partner relationship management are positively related to safety performance. However, facility and cargo management and accident prevention and processing were not found to have substantial positive impacts on security performance what is controversial to many safety studies. Improved access control, material handling, information processing and reporting of anomalies are clearly factors that are positively related to safety performance based on several work place safety studies. The difference is probably due to questions that defined safety performance: the study addressed accidents and property damages while safety studies measure often near misses and their reporting.

The FP7 CORE project utilizes key performance Indicators (KPIs) to assess and monitor organization’s performance at the operational level. Two CORE KPI’s measure address safety and customs clearance performance, consequently the supply chain security framework can well be adapted on the CORE context. Improved access control, cargo handling, shipping information processing and reporting of anomalies can be measured by using the construct for ‘facility and cargo management’. CORE Training and education can be embedded into the factor ‘accident prevention and processing’ that captures documenting and disseminating of security information. ‘Partner relationship management’ can be tested as a mediating factor that controls how strongly implemented CORE interventions influence on organizational performance indicators in specific demonstrations. Customs agencies can consider using four dimensions of supply chain security as criteria for assessing security performance in container shipping firms. Finally the dimensions and attributes of the framework provide a tool to analyse qualitative data in the project where getting reliable quantitative data is challenging.

Reference: Ching‐Chiao Yang, Hsiao‐Hsuan Wei, “The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations”, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 18 Iss: 1, pp.74 – 85

 

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Supply chain efficiency and security: Coordination for collaborative investment in technology (Lee et al. 2011)

Summary

Information technologies often provide significant benefits for companies in terms of better logistics efficiency and security. But despite of this fact, many companies in the logistics sector have not adopted such technologies to a high extent as one would expect. In their research paper, Lee et al. (2011) investigate coordination problems and related incentive mechanisms between manufacturers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain, when companies are investing in ICT technologies that have potential to improve both logistics efficiency and security. Using mathematical modeling, they find that relative strengths of efficiency and security concerns result in different coordination problems when implementing a technology. To increase overcome coordination problems and reach the optimal level of ICT investments, the authors propose imposing penalties on parties, that are responsible for security breaches, and introducing tax incentives. They conclude that IT-based supply chain security solutions have a high potential for increasing both security and logistics performance through higher supply chain visibility. The abstract is available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA) based on his doctoral thesis.

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Full review

Lee et al. (2011) consider the SCS performance rather narrowly as the organization’s ability to locate and eliminate the source of a product contamination. This is a rather unorthodox approach: scholars commonly consider SCS performance in terms of capability to prevent, detect and recover from crime that takes place in the supply chain context. But regardless of the narrow scope, the paper provides useful information how about to protect cargo from hostile tampering cost-effectively. This is particularly relevant for the CORE demonstrator with fast-moving consumer goods of Procter & Gamble (WP17). Also partners involved in the development of educational and training material are going to benefit from the findings of this research paper.

Reference

Lee, J., Palekar, U. S., & Qualls, W. (2011). Supply chain efficiency and security: Coordination * for collaborative investment in technology. European Journal of Operational Research, 210(3), 568-578.

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Interview with Ms. Sarma on the US CSP-program

28.6.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview with Ms. Dace Sarma from CRDF Global focuses on the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program

 

Hi Dace, and thanks for joining CBRA Interview. Can you please tell first a bit of your background and what you do today?

I work at CRDF Global, an independent nonprofit organization that promotes international scientific and technical collaboration through grants, technical resources, training and services. At CRDF Global, I work in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program, CSP in short, on programming collaborating with government, security, academic, and industrial communities around the world to strengthen their ability to thwart chemical attacks. Prior to working with CSP, I supported and implemented the Department of State’s Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, WMDT in short, projects within the scope of CRDF Global support for the WMDT.

 

Thanks for sharing that. Can you explain more about CRDF Global and the Chemical Security Program, CSP, by the US State Department?

CSP works with a number of implementing partners, including CRDF Global, to promote chemical security through sponsorship of projects designed to identify and address chemical security vulnerabilities and prevent chemical attacks.

CSP collaborates with diverse stakeholders, including partner governments, subject matter experts, and international organizations, to enhance chemical security through capacity building workshops, and trainings.

 

I had the pleasure to join twice the CRDF Global workshops in 2015: first to Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015, and second to Istanbul, Turkey, in December 2015. The former workshop was targeted for the Egyptian government and chemical industry, and the latter one for the Iraqi government and chemical industry. Extremely interesting 3-4 days in both workshops, with great audiences and co-speakers / co-facilitators. In both workshops I gave presentations e.g. on FP7-project CORE / dangerous goods tracking, and on Dow Chemical supply chain security – thanks again to Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio and Dr. Toni Mannisto of CBRA for co-producing these presentations. What is the current status of CSP regarding these countries today, if I may ask?

Thank you again for your participation in these workshops, Juha. We all appreciated you sharing your experience in chemical supply chain and transportation security.

We have continued work with our partners in Egypt on chemical supply chain security. CRDF Global, the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Environmental Compliance Office (FEI-ECO) and the Federation of Egyptian Industries’ Chamber of Chemical Industries (CCI) held an event in December, also sponsored by CSP, which convened 170 government, industry and academia representatives from Egypt’s chemical sector to highlight Egypt’s achievements in securing the chemical supply chain and identify further steps required to secure their chemicals in transit.  FEI-ECO and CCI are also working to provide technical guidance and support for Egyptian chemical companies to adopt Responsible Care®, an international voluntary chemical management initiative developed by the chemical industry to help chemical companies operate safely, securely and profitably.

In Iraq, CRDF Global and CSP have continued to work closely with a variety of partners from across the chemical and security communities. Most recently in April, with sponsorship from CSP, CRDF Global implemented the 1st National Chemical and Biological Security Coordination Conference in Baghdad. The conference convened Iraqi government, security, industrial, and academic sectors to discuss national efforts, interagency coordination, and best practices to counter chemical and biological proliferation in Iraq.

 

Any plans in 2016 to organize similar workshops in the MENA region?

We will continue to work with our international partners, including in the MENA region, in 2016. As the world becomes more connected, we will continue to focus on securing the chemical supply chain.  Many of our partners have also identified chemical ground transportation security as an area of particular interest.  We look forward to working with technical experts like CBRA and leaders from chemical communities worldwide to enhance global chemical security.

 

Thanks a lot Dace for this interview – and hope to meet you soon again, at one the upcoming missions / workshops! Juha

Mr. Mike Ellis, INTERPOL, on illicit trade and counterfeiting

Today’s CBRA Interview is with Mr. Mike Ellis who is the Assistant Director of Illicit Trade and Anti-counterfeit Sub-crime Directorate at INTERPOL, Lyon, France.

Hi Mike, can you first tell a bit who are you and what you do?

I am the Assistant Director for Police Services at INTERPOL, based in Lyon France.  INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization. Our role is to assist law enforcement agencies in our 190 member countries to combat all forms of transnational crime. We work to help police across the world meet the growing challenges of crime in the 21st century by providing a high-tech infrastructure of technical and operational support. Our services include targeted training, expert investigative support, specialized databases and secure police communications channels. I am responsible for the coordination of all activities related to illicit trade, smuggling of illicit goods and counterfeiting for the organization and police forces within our 190 member countries.  I lead a team of expert officers who are engaged in training, capacity building, and operational support who operate along with my analytical support who manage risk awareness and intelligence handling.

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From your perspective, how bad is the current situation with counterfeit and other illicit trade in global supply chains? Can one for example see links between illicit trade and transnational organized crime groups; or, even terrorist organizations?

For many years the clear link has been established between the trafficking of illicit goods and transnational organized crime. Criminal organizations are attracted by the lucrative profits involved in trading counterfeit or fake goods, or in trading legitimate goods through illicit channels. The criminals involved manufacture and trade illicit goods on a regional and increasingly global scale.  It is well documented that they use the profits to fund other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and people smuggling, and for investment into funding subversive political groups.  Selling fake or counterfeit products is one aspect of illicit trade, as is selling genuine goods on the black market to avoid paying taxes. By avoiding regulatory controls, the criminals behind these activities peddle dangerous and illicit goods with a complete disregard for the health and safety of consumers. The phenomenon has grown to an unprecedented level, posing tremendous risks to society and the global economy. Counterfeiting harms businesses which produce and sell legitimate products, governments lose tax revenue from products manufactured or sold on the black market, and consumers are at risk from substandard products.

By the way, we met first time about one year ago in Lyon at an INTERPOL workshop linked to FP7-Project CORE. One of the main objectives of CORE-project is to develop leading edge education and training materials on supply chain security – for the benefit of law enforcement agencies, supply chain practitioners, and academics alike. Can you share your views about law enforcement – academia – industry cooperation in education material development, as well as in the broader field of supply chain security management?

One of our principle functions is capacity building and training.  At INTERPOL we recognize that capacity building brings with it raised identification of the impact of illicit cross-border trade and counterfeiting and all our new operations, or established operations in new regions, are preceded by a capacity building workshop.  The public domain is represented by police, customs, border control officials, and prosecutors, as well as representatives from various regulatory bodies including trading standards.  In addition, INTERPOL TIGC, the Trafficking in Illicit Goods and Counterfeiting program which I am heading, has developed a Mentoring Program which aims to increase cross-border, cross-industry law enforcement operational interventions by: strengthening capacity to deal with all types of cross-border trafficking in illicit and counterfeit products. We have also developed an online International Intellectual Property Crime Investigator’s College and have built already a robust network of over 10.000 law enforcement officers, and partner stakeholders with specialist knowledge and skillset.  This online training course provides specialist knowledge on transnational organized crime.  It is aimed at all law enforcement officials, regulatory authorities and private sector investigators who are committed in the fight against illicit trade and intellectual property crime.   We aim to provide crime professionals with specialist awareness and learning on the subject of transnational organized intellectual property, IP, crime, and illicit trade, by delivery of leading-edge training that meets international standards and allows crime investigators from any discipline to quickly identify other certified investigators.  Through this learning platform we also facilitate cooperation between the public and private sectors in the fight against IP crime, and ensure all public and private sector crime investigators have a common understanding of the problems facing them, while being aware of each other’s competencies and roles.  We seek to promote knowledge on what intervention strategies and tactics work, in order that all stakeholders are better able to work together in partnership in enforcement operations.

Thank you Mike for this highly interesting interview. It complements well our previous interviews on similar themes – with non-law enforcement experts including Mr. David Hamon and Mr. Tony Barone. CBRA and the whole FP7-CORE consortium, around 70 partners in total, wishes to continue the great cooperation in research and education material development with INTERPOL, throughout the CORE-project, until April 2018 – and beyond!  Juha.

 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)

Summary: The GAO report is about measuring the performance of the Adjudication Centre that is a department within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsible for administering background checks for people who need access to secure facilities unescorted. The centre issues the access credentials based on a through vetting of the applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and connections to terrorist groups, among other checks. The report argues that the Adjunction Centre could improve the efficiency of the background checks – the individual security threat assessment – by improving its performance measurement system through better data and indicators. Although this GAO report focuses on a rather narrow topic, management of the background checking process, the report’s insights could benefit the CORE’s risk management cluster and those demonstrations that deal with access control matters. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf

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Full review: This GAO document is closely related to the work the CORE’s risk cluster. The report describes problems the TSA’s Adjudication Centre faces when it manages the background checking process of the US-based transportation worker identification credentials (TWIC), hazardous materials endorsements (HME) and Aviation Worker (AV) authorization programs. Moreover, since access control is a central security solution in nearly all CORE demonstrators, the demonstrations might benefit from tips and guidance this report offers. At the final stages of the project, this GAO report might prove a useful document when the project consortium produces training materials on how to manage access control systems and how to administer background checks.

Cross-references:

  • Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.

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Additional keywords: Terrorism, background checks

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Chemical Security in Istanbul

2015-12-15 09.02.08I had the most interesting week in Istanbul with the Iraqi government representatives, chemical sector companies and the US State Department Chemical Security Program, CSP.

Security in the chemical supply chain is a major challenge for government agencies and chemical supply chain companies across the globe, including those in the Middle-East and North African (MENA) region. Theft, diversion, trafficking, export violations, counterfeit chemicals, sabotage and terrorism – among other criminal threats – keep the agencies and companies constantly on their toes when considering how to best tackle the vulnerabilities and threats in their respective chemical supply chains.

This was my second time to join as an external expert in a Chemical Security Program (CSP) event in the MENA region. The first time was in Hurghada, Egypt, in March 2015 – thanks again to Professor Andrew Thomas, the Chief Editor of the Journal of Transportation Security, for hooking me up with CRDF Global and the US State Department on this. Now the four day event targeted for the relevant Iraqi government agencies as well as the Iraqi chemical sector companies was held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 14-17 December 2015.

We had a fully packed agenda: Day 1 consisted of several introductory and state-of-play speeches by the workshop facilitators and by Iraqi experts, the latter group sharing key governmental, industry and academic perspectives to the chemical security progress in Iraq.  Day 2 started with a case study presentation on “Post-2001 supply chain security developments at Dow Chemicals”, followed by private-public partnership considerations in chemical supply chain security. During the afternoon of day 2, two more presentations were given on potential threats to materials of interest, as well as on site-physical security. Day 3 started with presentations on international transport of dangerous goods and security rules, followed later by presentations on export control and border security issues, as well as risk assessment methodological aspects.

Interactive sessions, group exercises and other discussions were vivid throughout the four days. On day 1, the main interactive session was about government-industry coordination. On day 2, the focus shifted to identifying key players in Iraqi chemical supply chain security, as well as exploring private sector specific chemical security issues. On day 3, a major interactive session took place to recognize existing vulnerabilities and threats in the chemical supply chain, as well as to identify appropriate countermeasures and other possible means of improvement. And finally, on day 4, a draft table of content for a potential “Iraqi chemical supply chain security master plan and implementation roadmap” was produced in a highly interactive manner, followed ultimately by drafting some actual planning content in areas including chemical transport security and raising security awareness.

The actual workshop outcomes and possible follow-up actions will be worked upon later by the organizing team and some key participants. In the meanwhile, I want to express my warmest thanks for this opportunity and great on-site collaboration in Istanbul to: Ms. Shawn Garcia from the U.S. Department of State, Chemical Security Program (DOS/CSP); Ms. Pelin Kavak and Mr. Nidal Abu Sammour from CRDF Global, US / Jordan; and Dr. Caner Zanbak and Mr. Mustafa Bagan from the Turkish Chemical Manufacturers Association (TCMA). Hope to meet you again in 2016 in Iraq, Algeria and possibly other locations in the MENA region!

 

Cheers, Juha Hintsa

P.S. We also tested two CBRA frameworks / models – CBRA SCS15/16, and CBRA-BAC-Actions and beneficiaries – with the audience during the Istanbul week. Both of them were well perceived, and will be topics for CBRA Blog during the coming couple of months. (SCS = Supply Chain Security, and BAC = Border Agency Cooperation).

PPS. Last but not least I would like to thank Ms. Antonella Di Fazio of Telespazio, Italy, and FP7-project CORE, for excellent inputs on transport of dangerous goods, traceability and monitoring solutions, demonstrators, and practical experiences.