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CORE-Observatory

CEN Supply Chain Security — Good Practice Guide for Small and Medium Sized Operators, 2012 (CORE1030)

Summary: This is a guidance document for small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs. on how to apply a supply chain security approach to their operations in order to mitigate the risk of criminal activities. It gives an overview of the main crime types occurring in the supply chain along with some countermeasures, as well as the supply chain security initiatives, and the compliance requirements thereof. The document is available for purchase e.g. at:   http://shop.bsigroup.com/ProductDetail/?pid=000000000030258778  (link tested on 3 March 2016)

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Full review: The recommended supply chain strategy rests on a six-step approach. The first step is to define a context for the supply chain, crime prevention and security management activities taking into consideration the security sensitiveness, the geography and transport modes, and the main stakeholders involved in the supply chain operation. The second step is to make a threat and vulnerability analysis with regard to terrorist and other criminal threats in the supply chain. The main criteria included are the gaps existing in enhanced security, the high-risk crime types, and the potential consequences of crime occurrences. The third step covers the regulatory framework, the major aspects being the regulations and programs required for successful business operations, expectations of customers and suppliers, requirements laid down by insurance providers, and relevant government authorities. The fourth step refers to an overall security plan, taking into account the physical security, data security, human resources security (including selection, training, and exit procedures), business partner security (including selection, and auditing), and process control and monitoring of deviations. The fifth step involves implementing into practice concrete security measures, investment in technologies, procurement of services, in-house solutions and so forth. The final step is to monitor and measure the security performance and take appropriate corrective actions.

Five supply chain crime types have been elucidated in this guide. These include:  Property theft (cargo theft, intellectual property breaches); targeted damage (terrorism, sabotage); cross-border duty and tax fraud; illegitimate transporting, exporting and/or importing (smuggling of prohibited and restricted goods, people smuggling); and crime facilitation (document forgery, bogus companies, cybercrime). For each crime type, the main focus should be on the issue (main features and typical sectors/products involved), scope of the problem and actions to mitigate risks.

This guidebook has chosen eight security initiatives for illustration purposes. It explains the context of each initiative, whom it is meant for, and some basic requirements and the implications. These are as follows:

  • Import Control System (ICS) in the EU (a systems tool meant for the lodging and processing of Entry Summary Declarations, and for the exchange of messages across national customs agencies, economic operators and the European Commission).
  • Export Control System (ECS) in the EU (introduces EU procedures to computerize and control indirect exports and to implement the EU safety and security regulations);
  • Maritime Security Legislation, International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in the EU (International regulations to ensure the security of maritime transportation are being issued by the International Maritime Organization, IMO, in the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code);
  • Aviation Security Legislation, Air Cargo Supply Chains in the EU (three categories of aviation security legislation exist in the EU- Framework regulation, supplementing regulations, and implementing regulations-all targeted towards civil aviation security).
  • European Union Authorized Economic Operator, EU AEO (operators involved in international trade of goods certified as complying with WCO or equivalent supply chain security standards);
  • Regulated agent, Known consignor and Account consignor in the EU (Specific “trusted trader” status existing in the European air cargo supply chains);
  • ISO 28000 Series of Standards on Supply Chain Security Management Systems (address potential security issues at all stages of the supply process, e.g. terrorism, fraud and piracy);
  • Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) in Europe (fighting cargo crime using real-time intelligence and the latest preventative measures).

CORE1030

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices, GAO, April 2008 (CORE1011)

Summary: The GAO report discusses the progress the Customs and Border Protection (CPB), a component agency of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made since 2015 with its flagship business-private supply chain security program Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The report focuses on three main areas of the C-TPAT’s management and governance: (1) awarding benefits for the C-TPAT compliant companies, (2) validating the member companies’ security compliance and (3) addressing CBP’s staffing challenges that the increasing popularity of the C-TPAT program brings. The report recommends CPB to improve its C-TPAT validation processes and instruments and to establish performance criteria for assessing the program’s impact on supply chain security and trade facilitation. The C-TPAT program and this GAO report contain useful information for the CORE’s demonstrations that import goods into the US. Also the CORE’s risk cluster can learn about opportunities and challenges a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security entails. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/274773.pdf.

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Full review: This report contains information that is particularly useful for two CORE demonstrators that cover US imports. The first WP9 demonstration is about shipping automobile parts from the EU to the US via the port of Bremerhaven. In this demo, the General Motors (GM) is the importer. Because GM holds a C-TPAT certificate, most of the information this report offers about the status and challenges of the C-TPAT program must be of interest for the company and for its CORE demonstration. The same applies to the WP14 demonstration “FALACUS” that is about importing ceramic tiles from Italy to the US via the Port of La Spezia. The demonstration has to deal with the C-TPAT program, and therefore the demo partners’ might benefit from studying this GAO report. In addition to the demonstrations, this report might support the work of the CORE’s risk cluster because the document discusses in detail challenges and possibilities of a voluntary, risk-based supply chain security program, which builds on business-government collaboration.

Cross-references:

Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.

Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.

Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.

Additional keywords: Border security, customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT), supply chain security, counter-terrorism

CORE1011

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SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY – CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain, GAO, August 2008 (CORE1009)

Summary: This report discusses how the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has (1) contributed to international supply chain security standards and (2) promoted mutual recognition in the customs security area and (3) how the agency expects to implement the 100% scanning requirement of the containerized US-bound maritime cargo. The report provides a detailed outlook on the US customs supply chain security scheme, and it highlights challenges and problems that the US government faces in promoting its supply chain security strategy internationally. The development and the implementation of the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards, a suite of best practices on customs security, is a central theme throughout this GAO report. Because of its broad scope, the customs-related supply chain security, this document contains information that is likely to be useful for all CORE work packages, and especially for those that involve customs administrations. The report is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279730.pdf.

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Full review: This document provides a detailed outlook on customs-centric supply chain security from the US government’s perspective. This unique view on the customs security is going to be useful for the CORE’s early work packages that seek to describe the state-of-the-art of the global supply chain security. The information is also useful for the CORE demonstrations, in which customs administrations are involved. In particular, the demonstrations (WP9 and WP14) that are about US-bound trade and logistics benefit from the detailed description of the customs security initiatives that the US government has introduced since the 9/11 tragedy.

Cross-references:

  • Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008.
  • Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation’s Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
  • Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. April 26, 2007.
  • Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
  • Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
  • Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
  • Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.

Additional keywords: Mutual recognition, regulatory harmonization, 100% scanning legislation, SAFE framework of standards, World Customs Organizations, Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) programs, Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism

CORE1009

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TRANSPORTATION SECURITY – Action Needed to Strengthen TSA’s Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO, 2013 (CORE1015)

Summary: The GAO report is about measuring the performance of the Adjudication Centre that is a department within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsible for administering background checks for people who need access to secure facilities unescorted. The centre issues the access credentials based on a through vetting of the applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and connections to terrorist groups, among other checks. The report argues that the Adjunction Centre could improve the efficiency of the background checks – the individual security threat assessment – by improving its performance measurement system through better data and indicators. Although this GAO report focuses on a rather narrow topic, management of the background checking process, the report’s insights could benefit the CORE’s risk management cluster and those demonstrations that deal with access control matters. The report is available at: http://gao.gov/assets/660/656051.pdf

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Full review: This GAO document is closely related to the work the CORE’s risk cluster. The report describes problems the TSA’s Adjudication Centre faces when it manages the background checking process of the US-based transportation worker identification credentials (TWIC), hazardous materials endorsements (HME) and Aviation Worker (AV) authorization programs. Moreover, since access control is a central security solution in nearly all CORE demonstrators, the demonstrations might benefit from tips and guidance this report offers. At the final stages of the project, this GAO report might prove a useful document when the project consortium produces training materials on how to manage access control systems and how to administer background checks.

Cross-references:

  • Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.
  • Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.

CORE1015

Additional keywords: Terrorism, background checks

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Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration 2015 (CORE2010)

Summary

This document sets a vision of the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the primary border control agency present at the US borders, for year 2020. The vision builds on four general goals and associated objectives that aim to improve safety, security and prosperity of the American people. Collaboration, risk management as well as exchange and exploitation of information and intelligence are in the heart of the vision document and integral elements of its goals and objectives. The vision document is available at: http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The vision’s first goal is to counter transnational terrorism and crime at and beyond the US borders. Keys to effective counter-terrorism and anti-crime efforts are understanding of threat landscape as well as interagency and international coordination on border management. The second goal is about promoting a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to border security and management, in order to exploit complementary capabilities of various border control agencies to the fullest extent. Specific objectives underpinning this goal are “situational awareness of the air, land and maritime borders”, “detection, interdiction and disruption of illegal border activities” and “strengthening comprehensive trade enforcement. Here the key is to collect information and intelligence about trade flows and carry out risk assessment to identify and target high-risk cargo movements and facilitate low-risk traffic. Other objectives are strengthening processes to conduct out-bound enforcement and interdiction of travelers and cargo as well as advance a comprehensive, predictive targeting strategy to identify threats as early as possible.

The third goal is about enhancing the US economic competitiveness by facilitating lawful trade and travel. The goal consists of objectives that seek to reduce cost of trade and travel by streamlining customs processes. Other objectives are to harmonize procedures throughout US government agencies and to develop risk-segmentation for better facilitation of low-risk trade and travel. Agility and adaptability of the CBP organization is the fourth goal. Sub-goals, or objectives, include optimization of CBP’s organizational structure, strengthening organizational structure and advance CBP’s effectiveness through technologies and business innovations. The vision document concludes with a presentation of principles and process of risk management in the customs context.

This vision document contains lots of relevant information for many CORE work packages, especially for those that deal with US-bound supply chains (WP9, WP14 and WP17. Certainly, also work packages dealing with risk assessment and educational material benefit from this material. Altogether, revealing strategic priorities of the CBP, the document reflects the trends of customs-centric supply chain security worldwide, and this information is very valuable for CORE and its work packages.

Reference

US CBP, 2015. Vision and Strategy 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan – Delivering safety, security, and prosperity through collaboration, innovation, and integration

CORE2010

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Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. Barka, H., B., 2012 (CORE2009)

Summary

Pan-African economic integration has progressed over past years, producing a broad range of regional trade agreements and economic communities that seek to harmonise policies, develop common infrastructure and remove barriers to intra-African trade. Against expectations, however, this increased integration has not translated into strong economic growth in Africa. This article discusses how sub-Saharan countries can overcome trade barriers that undermine the African economic integration. The article’s focus is on border posts and customs procedures that play a key role in facilitating cross-border traffic.

According to the article, the problems of international trade in Africa are largely explained by inadequate infrastructure that creates congestion and limits connectivity, delays that stem from complex and manual customs procedures, corruption and by illicit trade. One-stop-border-posts are a promising approach to streamline customs procedures and curb corruption. The joint border post may bring trade facilitation benefits as significant as costly investments on roads, ports, bridges and other transport infrastructure. The articles highlights the Chirundu One-Stop Border Post between Zambia and Zimbabwe as a successful case of border agency cooperation. Previous Observatory review (CORE2008, 20 January 2016) describes the Chirundu border crossing in more detail.

The paper concludes by suggesting One-Stop-Border-Post as a promising way towards higher trade facilitation and African integration. To organise one-stop-border-post, the first thing to do is to analyse roles and procedures of different border control agencies. The task of high-level governance is to define how responsibilities across the various border control agencies are harmonised, coordinated and delegated. Metrics and statistics should underpin the design, as numerical data into traffic flows and clearance times are likely to reveal the major bottlenecks in the cross-border traffic. Finally, the article proposes extended exchange of information and data across government agencies, domestically and internationally. The article is available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE_INTRA%20AFRICAN%20TRADE.pdf

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The discussion on one-stop-border-posts in the African context is closely related to the CORE project and its many work packages. Especially the WP12, the demonstrator Schipol, that deals with imports of fresh cut flowers from Kenya to the Netherlands, benefits from the insights into African bureaucratic practices at many African borders. The demonstrator should consider the set of recommendations for higher border agency cooperation that the article proposes. Besides the demonstrators, the article provides a concise and informative outlook on international in Africa. At least CORE’s WP19, should consider the African perspective on cross-border trade when developing training material.

Reference

Barka, H., B., 2012. Border Posts, Checkpoints, and Intra-African Trade: Challenges and Solutions. African Development Bank

CORE2009

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Introduction to Supply Chain Management (CASSANDRA Compendium Chapter 2, CORE2007a)

Summary

The second chapter of the CASSANDRA compendium gives a general outlook on the theory and practice of modern supply chain management. Written in lay-man’s language, the text explains a broad range of strategies for managing supply chains, from lean management to agile and responsive logistics. The chapter also defines fundamental supply chain terminology and discusses current trends in the logistics, including synchromodality, use of 4PL logistics service providers, and green logistics. The chapter introduces several supply chain reference frameworks that illustrate a series of interdependent activities and stakeholders involved in the international transport of cargo. The CASSANDRA compendium is available for download here.

Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

The compendium summarizes the SCOR and UN/CEFACT supply chain models, that may be the two most used logistics reference frameworks in the world. The document also discusses less known academic conceptual models that seek to simplify the complexity of supply chain management by categorizing and explaining management strategies, activities, stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities. The section on the future trends in logistics offers a great outlook on the most likely changes and driving forces in the logistics industry. The outlook suggests that for example synchromodality (increased flexibility in transport mode selection), green logistics (less emissions), use of 4PL logistics service providers (outsourced supply chain management), and continuously increasing ship and port sizes will reshape the cross-border logistics over the years. The document also explains key CASSANDRA concepts and their impacts on international supply chain management. For instance, the Data Pipeline, a pivotal CASSANDRA concept, seeks to enhance sharing of information across supply chain stakeholders, in particularly from business operators to customs and other border control authorities. Most importantly, the Data Pipeline would allow customs officers to access commercial information, that normally is exchanged only between buyers and sellers, early in the upstream supply chain at the consignment completion point (CCP). This accurate, early commercial information would enable the customs and other border control agencies to assess security and other risks of cargo early on.

All in all, the document provides a crash refresher course on basic and advanced logistics terminology that would be beneficial for many the CORE consortium, especially for those partners whose expertise is mainly outside the logistics industry. The CORE demonstrators benefit from descriptions of CASSANDRA innovations that support information exchange and improve visibility across the supply chain. The demos might choose to reuse some of these CASSANDRA innovations or their components. The CASSANDRA compendium also contains a great deal of material that could be reused for education and training purposes in CORE (WP19). Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations that are relevant also for CORE. The chapter recommends, for example, that because of broad variety of international supply chains, CASSANDRA solutions should be adaptable for different contexts.

Reference

Hintsa, J. and Uronen, K. (Eds.) (2012), “Common assessment and analysis of risk in global supply chains “, Compendium of FP7-project CASSANDRA, Chapter 2

CORE2007

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Trade and money laundering uncontained (the Economist, May 2014, CORE2006)

Summary

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

International trade is becoming one of the main instruments for cross-border money laundering aside common bank transfers, remittances and cash smuggling. The ”trade-based money laundering” disguises illegal trading as seemingly legitimate commercial transactions. The most common technique is mis-invoicing in which fraudsters undervalue imports or overvalue exports to repatriate ill-gotten money from abroad. For example, official records show that Mexican exports to US are much higher than the US imports from Mexico, a discrepancy that signs fraud by Mexican criminals, most likely drug cartels. In general, the trade-based money laundering offers new financial tools for a broad range of drug traffickers, arms smugglers, corrupt politicians, terrorists and evaders of taxes, duties and capital controls.

The new methods for cross-border money laundering and tax evasion concern most CORE demonstrations, especially those involving international cargo movements. The emerging risk of trade-based money laundering calls for new and more effective enforcement of trade transactions. CORE is developing new solutions (e.g., data pipeline and system-based supervision) for capturing and sharing trade information across logistics operators and law enforcement agencies. The new solutions likely improve law enforcement’s capability to detect suspicious trade transactions that may have something to do with the trade-based money laundering. However, building such capability requires IT integration (e.g., interoperability), risk awareness and education and training. CORE consortium addresses these complementary activities in work carried out in risk, IT and educational clusters.

Reference

Trade and money laundering uncontained, the Economist, May 3rd 2014

CORE2006

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Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle (the Economist May 2014, CORE2005)

Summary

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route to the strengthened enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. The South American cocaine smuggling routes have displaced several times over the years due, and now again the Caribbean route is the same one than traffickers used two decades ago. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

The drug traffickers move significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes, sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. Review by Toni Männistö (CBRA)

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Full review

Anti-drug officials report rising cocaine imports into the US through the Caribbean islands. The officials ascribe the increasing popularity of the Caribbean route strengthened law enforcement of alternative trafficking routes. Because traffickers prefer smuggling routes that offer the highest profit-to-risk ratios, the South American cocaine smuggling networks are evolving constantly. Routes have displaced several times over the years, and now the route is again the same than two decades ago.

Today, traffickers move again significant amounts of their cocaine from Colombian coca farms and laboratories to Venezuela by jungle trails, riverboats and small aircraft. From the Venezuelan coast, the contraband is smuggled to Caribbean islands by speedboats, planes and sometimes hidden inside commercial cargo. The cocaine traffickers use then yachts, mules, cruise ships, fast boats and commercial cargo vessels to smuggle the illegal drugs into the US and Europe.  The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean. The new wave of trafficking through is expected to increase violence and undermine anti-corruption efforts in the Caribbean.

Trends of international drug trafficking often influence intensity of law enforcement efforts in global supply chains. Thus, changes in South American drug trafficking may affect also the two CORE trade lanes that import goods from the region into Europe, (1) imports of fresh cut flowers from Colombia to the Netherlands (WP11) and (2) imports of coffee and cocoa beans from South America to Europe (WP13). These trade lanes may become subject to more intense anti-drug controls over the following years. Besides the CORE demo cluster, also the CORE risk cluster benefit from the insight this article provides on the recent trends in routes, volumes and methods of the South American drug trafficking. This information may be useful for CORE’s activities that are developing educational and training material.

Reference

Drug trafficking in the Caribbean – the Full circle, the Economist, May 24th 2014

CORE2005

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Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context, WCO 2015 (CORE2004)

The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities. More information at: http://www.wcoomd.org/en/media/newsroom/2015/december/wco-issues-the-punta-cana-resolution.aspx

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Full review

The new Punta Cana Resolution sets guidelines for customs’ security roles in the combat against the new wave of terrorism, as manifested by recent attacks in Tunisia, Turkey, Lebanon, France and Mali. The resolution highlights that the customs authorities are typically the first line of defense against transnational crime, terrorism and extremism: the customs control cross-border movements of people, cargo, money and modes of transport and thus protect communities against terrorists that may exploit international supply chains to move materials, funds or operatives across borders. Building on the previous WCO instruments and agreements, especially on the WCO Security Programme, the Punta Cana resolution is the customs community’s action plan and renewed pledge of solidarity that provides a diplomatic backdrop for further counterterrorism activities.

The Punta Cana resolution encourages customs administrations worldwide to intensify collaboration within the customs community and with other border control agencies, both domestically and internationally. In case of missing or obsolete counter-terrorism strategy, the resolution urges customs to add new security roles in their mandates and activities. The Punta Cana document also recommends customs to pay close regard to the WCO’s previous agreements and instruments, such as the WCO Compliance and Enforcement Package, SAFE Framework of Standards and the WCO Security Programme. At more practical level, the resolution promotes the use of the full range of modern detection and investigation techniques, especially advance risk profiling on the basis of Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The resolution also calls governments from around the world to provide necessary financial and human support so that their national customs administrations can contribute towards the goals of the WCO Security Programme.

The Punta Cana Resolution informs CORE consortium about the changing risk landscape where the threat of transnational terrorism is high again. The Resolution also reminds the CORE’s risk cluster of the three cornerstones of effective border security management: collaboration, technology and human resources. The Punta Cana document also gives an overlook on the customs’ security priorities over the following years. For example, the global customs community will likely invest a great deal of time and money to develop new risk profiling systems that tap into new data sources such as the Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). The same trend towards better risk profiling is likely to define also the future cargo security efforts at the borders.

Reference: WCO, 2015. Punta Cana Resolution, Resolution of the Policy Commission of the World Customs Organization on the Role of Customs in the Security Context.

CORE2004

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Interviews

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