Towards Trusted Trade-lanes (CORE1207)

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Summary: The paper explores the concept of trusted trade-lane. In trusted trade-lanes operators implement an internal control system that makes possible to detect, handle and report dubious events in a way that meet requirements of customs agencies. Writers identify three essential characteristics of trusted trade-lanes: single partners are considered reliable and trustworthy, collaboration is based on long-term partnerships powered by viable business opportunities and managed by a clear decision-making mechanism, and control systems ensures integrity of traded goods and transferred data. In addition, the paper presents three alternative scenarios how the trusted partnerships can be designed in cross-border trade. The paper can be viewed here: https://pure.uvt.nl.

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Full review: The paper present recent developments in designing forms of partnerships that make possible to manage, predict and reconstruct supply chain operations and events. Customs agencies can use the control system to complete law enforcement and administrative tasks in a way they can reduce or even refrain from physical inspections and checks. The trading partners that have adopted the common control system and expanded it to the needs of regulatory bodies form trusted trade-lanes. Writers identify three essential characteristics of a trusted trade-lane. First, all partners operate transparently, reliable and trustworthy in their business relationships.  Second, partners are committed in long-term collaboration that gives all partners opportunities to succeed. The government structure has clear decision making mechanisms and selected legal representative. Third, partners must implement and manage a control system that ensures integrity of transported goods and transformed data within the partners and to the authorities.

The writers design three alternatives how partnerships can evolve into trusted trade-lanes. First, a focal company can act as a supply chain orchestrator and provider technical infrastructure for use of trading partners and logistics operators. The focal company lodges customs declarations and risk information to customs administrations on behalf of the trusted trade-lane partners. In the second alternative, a service provider manages a peer-to-peer information platform that supply chain operators use to communicate between each other and with customs agencies. Data on the platform is reused for both commercial and regulatory purposes (piggy packing). Partners can join and leave the platform as they see appropriate. The platform uses open standards and database management systems. Third, a service provider offers additional ‘assurance’ services for legally independent companies of a specific industrial area. The service provider acts as a trusted trader and defines common rules and requirements for the membership.

The paper demonstrates preliminary results in the CORE project. The project partners adapt trusted trade-lane concept in their own concrete business and logistics processes as well as in their information systems. The models and scenarios are further amended and developed during the project.

Reference: Hulstijn, J., Hofman, W., Zomer, G., & Tan, Y-H. (2016). Towards trusted trade-lanes. In H. J. Scholl, O. Glassey, M. Janssen, & E. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 15th IFIP E-Government conference (EGOV 2016): Electronic Government. (pp. 299-311). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9820). Guimaraes, Portugal: Springer International Publishing.

 

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Integrating carrier selection with supplier selection decisions to improve supply chain security (CORE1206)

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Summary: The paper describes a collaborative decision making process that makes possible to select optimal combination of suppliers and carriers that meet both business operational and security requirements. Security information is quantified in order to create a pool of qualified suppliers and logistics providers. Quantification enables to incorporate security with other business criteria such as price, delivery and quality into an optimization model. Logistics and purchasing managers can use the model to analyze the tradeoff between these criteria. The paper can be viewed here: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.

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Full review: Different managers typically carry out security assessments and selections for logistics providers and suppliers separately. The study presents a mechanism for quantifying and measuring supply chain security that justifies removing of suppliers and carriers from further consideration if they fail to meet the minimum required security performance. In the next phase security is incorporated into an optimization model that minimize procurement and quality costs caused by late and rejected deliveries. The optimization model allows selecting a combination of suppliers and logistics providers that best suits their individual situation defined by risks and operational requirements. The study demonstrates how the tradeoff between security and cost can be assessed parallel in a way that the process leads to the better solutions than if assessed separately.

The paper presents a dynamic optimization tool that can be considered both revolutionary and easy to implement in practice. There are security-rating systems that set minimum requirements for suppliers and carriers such as TAPA Facility Security and Trucking Requirements that enable to create a pool of qualified service providers for transportation of high-value goods. However, several manufacturing and logistics companies are outside the TAPA system, because the goods produced and transported are not prone to thefts and hold-ups. For them it is a matter of internal management coordination when choosing suppliers and carriers and willingness to carry out necessary steps to minimize the cost of providing a secure supply chain. It is also a strategic decision, if company aims at minimizing internal costs by managing suppliers and carriers by contracts or operation management principles. Several international companies have chosen the first option by selecting one or two main service providers instead of issuing regularly quotations for materials and transportation services. The paper proves it is more a question of company practices to select suppliers and carries than minimizing internal management costs.

The paper brings very interesting viewpoint to the CORE project. The CORE project focus on managing risks and unexpected events through additional sensors and information systems. However, commercialization and selling of the CORE technologies and data management platforms requires understanding procurement processes in private and public organizations.  The presented model embeds security into the selection process of suppliers and carriers. It is essential the CORE project can identify decision-making moments that give opportunity to introduce new technologies and practices and improve collaboration in supply chain network. Only collaboration between logistics managers and purchasing managers as well as among buyers, suppliers, and carriers can result in improved supply chain security performance in the whole network.

Reference: Meixell, M. J., & Norbis, M. (2012). Integrating carrier selection with supplier selection decisions to improve supply chain security. International Transactions in Operational Research, 19(5), 711–732.

 

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Assessing the drivers of change for cross-border supply chains (CORE1205)

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Summary: This paper explores the main global change drivers and how they impact on international supply chain management in the next two decades. The Delhi method is adapted to structure communication, to produce well-grounded opinions and counter-arguments, and to find consensus among selected experts. The results highlight efficient networking and business-to-business and business-to-government collaboration as core supply chain management competences. The paper can be viewed here: http://www.emeraldinsight.com.

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Full review: The study aims at identifying the main change drivers that make companies to prioritize specific indicators and metrics in order to manage their operations. The experts concluded to the following eight key drivers: internet and e-commerce, new technologies for managing movements of goods and materials, versatility of customer demands, continuing chase after low cost labor in manufacturing, tighter security regulations, emerging role of ethics in corporate decision-making, increasing security and environmental concerns, and fluctuation of energy prices. Delivery performance and perfect order fulfillment will be the most important supply chain management indicators and metrics in the future. Customers will demand more tailored products to meet their individual needs what forces companies to manage material flows with an increasing number of stock keeping units.

While companies are required to offer wide product portfolio, they are also expected to have tools to manage harmful events and risks in their supply chain network. Unforeseen threats such as natural disasters, epidemics and customs inspections must be considered when structuring supply chain networks and selecting partners in the future. Consequently, companies must share more supply chain risk related information between business and governmental actors almost in real-time.  Automated data management with streamlined system interfaces between customs and companies will be the key for real time information sharing and networking. Current data exchange and compliance initiatives have already created a foundation for automation and faster flow of customs clearance documents. In addition, better relationship management between trade operators and customs are highlighted in the study.

The CORE concepts, technologies and services are very well aligned with findings in the study. Trusted trade lanes, system based approach and data pipelines reduce need for customs inspections at international borders. Visibility tools create an integrated solution to share information and collaborate between government agencies and privates supply chain stakeholders. Over 40 experts representing customs agencies, manufacturing companies, logistics operators, technology providers and insurance sector took part in the study. The study provides good arguments that help readers to sell supply chain security initiatives, technologies and services for both private and governmental operators.

Reference: Hameri, A.-P., & Hintsa, J. (2009). Assessing the drivers of change for cross-border supply chains. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(9), 741–761.

 

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Three new Senior Experts

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We have the pleasure to announce that the following three top experts in illicit trade and maritime security have recently joined the CBRA’s Consulting Team, as Senior Consultants: Ms. Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Mr. Michael Ellis and Mr. Lars W Lorenzen. We work closely with them in monitoring new calls and preparing project proposals – and, once new projects are funded, they play a key role in executing the actual research, consulting and training work. In the meanwhile, each one of them carries out other “non-CBRA professional activities”. In today’s CBRA Blog we introduce all the three of them, by sharing their short bios below. Please do not hesitate to contact us in case you see interesting joint project opportunities in the future! Have a great weekend everyone, Juha.

Ms. Vittoria Luda di Cortemiglia, Senior Consultant, Illicit Trade and Human Trafficking, Italy

Ms. Luda di Cortemiglia is a senior researcher and consultant with extensive experience on various criminal justice and supply chain security issues at international level. Experience specifically includes applied research and analysis as well as project management and training for professionals, in the field of illicit trafficking and supply chain security, including trafficking in persons, trafficking in counterfeit products, illicit trade in precious metals, illegal waste trade and eco-crimes, cybercrime and misuse of technologies. After graduating in Law at the University of Turin, Italy, 1999, Ms. Luda di Cortemiglia obtained a Master degree in International Relationships and Diplomacy at St. John’s University, New York, USA, in 2001, joining the United Nations in October 2001. Until September 2016 she has coordinated the programs and activities of the Emerging Crimes Unit at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). She has acted as UNICRI Focal Point for the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network (PNI), and from 2009 until 2016 she represented UNICRI within the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Human Trafficking (UN-ICAT).

Mr. Michael Ellis, Senior Consultant, Illicit Trade in Global Supply Chains, United Kingdom

Mr. Ellis has nearly 40 years of experience in law enforcement, coming from an operational policing background. He served with the London Metropolitan Police fighting against serious international and organised crime for 20 years, He was then engaged in the corporate security function in multinational firms, dealing with anti-counterfeit and illicit trade issues on a global basis for a further 16 years. Michael was with Universal Music, with IFPI, the music industry’s trade association, and with Beiersdorf. Most recently he was the Assistant Director of Police Services at INTERPOL and the Head of the INTERPOL Program on Traffic in Illicit Goods and Counterfeit. Michael was responsible for managing and coordinating INTERPOL’s global strategy to fight against this criminal activity, and he lead the police organisations international efforts in this area. Michael has a Master’s degree in Social Science, where he specifically researched the extensive links between organised crime and illicit trade and counterfeiting. Michael joined CBRAs consulting team on 1 October, 2016, as a Senior Consultant. He will be involved in various projects related to illicit trade and counterfeit goods in global supply chains.

Mr. Lars W Lorenzen, Senior Consultant, Maritime and Port Security, Denmark

Mr. Lorenzen has had a career with the Maersk Group spanning 37 years within a number of business units, notably within container transportation in the broadest sense. His particular knowledge and expertise covers the operational, equipment management, security, safety, standardization and regulatory sphere. He has been leading the Maersk Group work in obtaining and maintaining US C-TPAT and EU AEO-F supply chain security certifications and validations since the inception of both initiatives, while engaging with customers in shaping their profiles. As part of his security tasks, Lars has built and maintained a security response programme for the Maersk Line organisation, being also the focal point and first responder to security breaches. For a period, he was a member of the WCO PSCG (World Customs Organization Private Sector Consultative Group). During the past 20+ years he has been an appointed national expert in standardization work, mainly within ISO TC104 and TC204, including leadership of working groups – while heading the Danish delegation. Lars has served as a civil expert to NATO and other military initiatives by appointment of the Danish Government for the past 12 years, providing commercial views and factual information relating to logistics, and in the course of this participated in developing and conducting table top and other exercises.

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Interview with Mr. Boley, SC Johnson, Switzerland

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17.11.2016: Today’s CBRA Interview with Mr. Bill Boley focuses on supply chain security management at SC Johnson

Hi Bill, and thanks for joining CBRA Interview, here at the TAPA EMEA Conference in Noordwijk, the Netherlands.

Good afternoon Juha, first I want to thank you and the CBRA team for all the great work you have done for the Supply Chain Security Community over the years. It seems that every time I attend an event CBRA is there…

We first met in 2008, and worked together on the World Bank Supply chain security guidebook, good ol’ times…. In your current job, which supply chain security standards and guidebooks your company follows?

Here at SC Johnson we actually first strive to meet the guidelines laid out in the WCO SAFE Framework of Standards. This is important for us as a global player, global citizen and manufacturer with many supply chains, to do our part in assisting Customs and Law Enforcement Agencies making the Global Supply Chain more safe and secure. At the same time, safe and secure supply chains support the overall optimisation and predictability, helping us to meet the customer and consumer demands. This is why we pursue the various AEO schemes already in place around the world, be it C-TPAT, EU AEO, or Kenyan AEO – in other words, we strive to certify so Customs can focus on the unknowns…  At the warehouse level we have adapted the TAPA FSR standard as the “SCJ standard”. As a global company with many different nationalities, languages and moving parts both upstream and downstream a universal standard written for the practitioners is a key for us. It is also a requirement for our service providers and the transporters moving our product. Soon we will start to give preferential consideration to those service providers who have the TAPA TSR certification, as part of the contract award process.

What about information on actual threats and risks with your global supply chain – which sources you use for that? 

As you are well aware, we are facing many threats around the world: stowaways, weapons and drug smuggling, hijackings, cyber threats particularly with the Internet of Things, and counterfeiting, just to name a few…  At SC Johnson we are fortunate to have a buy-in from our C-Suite on the importance of Supply Chain Security programmes and tools we have been implementing. We have established a Global Security Operations Centre at our World Headquarters and, our Product Supply, Logistics, and Procurement Leaders around the world are very proactive on the topic of supply chain security.  SCJ has actually built an own network of information providers such as BSI, IJet, OSAC, and of course Law Enforcement Agencies, as well as select Customs regimes. The TAPA IIS system, FreightWatch International, and yes, even CBRA, also feed into our information portal. Getting involved at every level to develop a community of interest on supply chain security is a key. As they say, it takes a network to defeat a network.

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Can you share any stories on how these supply chain security standards and risk information have helped you to do your job as a SC Johnson supply chain security manager better?

Yes absolutely, most recently we fell victim to two separate events. One was facility related while the other was on transport. We conducted an analysis on how our mitigation measures failed, and it became evident that we lacked timely, accurate and relevant information to change our measure to adapt to the latest Modus Operandi of the criminal networks. Delivery times to our facilities, pick-ups, chain of custody, liaison with local Law Enforcement and audits of our service providers have been instrumental. In fact, just last week local Law Enforcement in Nigeria was able to interdict and recover a high value shipment, thanks to our close communication and cooperation with the Government of Nigeria.

Yesterday I briefed you about our on-going TAPA study titled “Total Cost of Cargo Theft (TCCT)”… Would your company be interested to join the study?

SC Johnson would be very receptive to taking part of this study. First, as we have suffered Supply chain losses there is a misunderstanding on what is covered by insurance or not. And, second, if we can then place a more precise value or declaration on what those stolen finished goods will cost outside of the retail value, that would be great. Loss of customers or at least their confidence in a non-delivery, recovering our full costs of production, investigative costs, etc. are just some of the cascading effects and costs we encounter.

Great news, thanks a lot Bill, for both the interview and for agreeing to join the TCCT-study! Juha.

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Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks (CORE1204)

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Summary: The requirement for 100% container scanning has been a burning topic, since U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued the initiative in order to prevent terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destructions into the U.S. The paper explores how much it is reasonable to come down from the 100% inspection rate, if deterrence and cost of retaliation are considered in the model. Deterrence means the power to dissuade an attacker from attempting to smuggle weapons as opposite to use coerce or compel.  Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred by an attacker e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network. It is assumed the defender discloses in advance how many containers are inspected. The paper can be viewed here: https://www.researchgate.net.

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Full review: The study provides an economical model based on the game theory to estimate the optimal inspection rates in order to deter perpetrators from smuggling weapons into the U.S. The model assumes the customs or Border agency aims at minimizing the expected damages and cost of inspections while perpetrators are simultaneously trying to maximize their rewards. The used parameters are number of attackers, estimated damages, the cost of inspecting a container, the cost of a smuggling attempt, the cost of retaliation and the probability of detecting weapons. Retaliation cost describes the cost incurred e.g. due to dismantling the attacker’s network.  Cost of a smuggling attempt are the costs of acquiring, developing or manufacturing the weapons, and any logistical costs required to smuggle them into the U.S.  It is assumed the government agency announces publicly the inspection level and set of retaliation policies. Retaliation policy must pose a credible threat that means the governmental agency would retaliate even if that were not economically justified.

The study has four main limitations. First, the paper does not describe under what conditions the model works well or poorly. The quality of strategic and tactical intelligence, the efficiency of criminal investigation and prosecution processes, the extent of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing, the degree of private sector involvement and successfulness of awareness campaigns on retaliation policies are probably factors that influence on the model and its parameters. Second, the study does not provide numerical estimates to the parameters such as detection rates and cost of retaliation. Third, it is very unlikely that weapons of mass destructions are transported in containers into the U.S., what makes it difficult to assess the usefulness of the model in real life cases. Forth, costs of retaliation are not calculated and published by law enforcement agencies, thus criminals cannot make decision based on financial risks.

Despite of these limitations the CORE project can adapt the game theory and benefit from the paper. Traditionally law enforcement agencies highlight the number of seizures, arrests and successful prosecutions to measure operations and their impacts. The presented model brings two interesting components, a cost of crime attempt and a cost of retaliation. If criminal activities are financed and managed based on the same principles like legal ones, expected losses due to seizures of illicit goods or drugs are very likely calculated in the criminal business models. Consequently, making criminal business unprofitable is key to stop criminal activities. The approach enables to model the dynamic between costs and rewards from viewpoints of both law enforcement and criminal actors. In the other words, the model makes possible to study two dimensions in the Innovation Agenda, societal costs and friction costs caused by implemented security measures.

Reference: Bier, Vicki M. & Haphuriwat, N. (2011). Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks. Annals of Operations Research, 187(1), 137–158.

 

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Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain (CORE1203)

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Summary: The paper presents cases how government agencies have reduced illicit tobacco trade by making the industry liable for controlling their supply chains. Tobacco companies were required to monitor the movement of lawfully manufactured tobacco products in their supply chains, and even retrospectively track the route taken when products were seized due to suspected excise fraud. According the paper illicit trade was substantially reduced, if manufacturers stopped delivering lawfully manufactured tobacco products in amounts that exceeded the tobacco market in the countries with lower excise duties. The criminal market dried out due to unavailability of illicit tobacco products that had been smuggled to the countries of higher excise duties by organized criminal groups. The document can be viewed at: http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com.

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Full review: The paper focuses on excise fraud and organized smuggling of originally legally produced tobacco products to the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. Based on internal company documents and court judgments the authors summarize evidence how the tobacco industry was involved directly and indirectly in the large-scale excise fraud. First, the companies delivered intentionally large quantities of tobacco products to the countries of low excise tax rates and uncontrolled distribution network. Then organized criminal groups shipped the purchased tobacco products illegally through their smuggling networks into the countries of higher excise duties.

The cutting off the tobacco supply to the illicit market is the key to intervene in large-scale organized tobacco smuggling. According the article by means of legislative and punitive interventions tobacco industry was forced to implement new export polices and practices. Tobacco companies invested in tracking and tracing systems that helped to identify points where shipped tobacco products diverted from the legal supply chain to the illicit markets. The companies implemented security processes in order to clearly identify they business partners and ensure business partners had no criminal records. Government agencies increased information sharing and inter-agency cooperation on a national and international level.  The interventions led to a substantial fall in customs seizures and a rise in legal sales.

CORE project can learn two things in the article. First, the global scope and multifaceted nature of the illicit tobacco trade requires visibility over shipment processes and efficient collaboration between governmental agencies and private sector. Second, the study implies risk to investigations and punitive damages made tobacco companies to pay attention in which markets their products finally end up. In other words, enforceable measures not voluntary agreements made industry liable for controlling their end-to-end supply chain and reduce societal risk.

Reference: Lara Joossens, L., & Raw, M. (2008). Progress in combating cigarette smuggling: controlling the supply chain. Tobacco Control, 17(6), 399–404.

 

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Conflict resolution in supply chain security, 2009 (CORE1202)

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Summary: The paper presents a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modeling theories. Decision and policy making on supply chain security is sensitive to technical, political, environmental, ethical and economical aspects. What aspects are emphasized depends on whom we ask. Consequently, broadly endorsed decisions and policies require balancing between these dimensions.  The presented conflict resolution approach identifies involved decision makers, their individual and collective goals and gives options how to agree on security interventions. A case study on trade facilitation and security enforcement illuminates the approach. The article can be purchased at: http://www.inderscienceonline.com.

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Full review: Conflicts are preprogrammed in supply chain security management, because different operators such as customs, port authorities, manufacturing companies, logistics providers and financial institutes collaborate with conflicting goals. For  example, a purchasing manager can be interested in ordering products manufactured in high-risk country due to lower cost while security manager might assess risks related to the seller exceeding the potential benefits. Port operation manager aims at loading and unloading cargo swiftly and safely to and from vessels under time pressure, while port security dislikes the idea of expediting shipments at the cost of inspections. Supply chain security is a multidisciplinary issue that can be addressed efficiently only through agreeing about decision-making and policy-making mechanisms.

The paper focuses on resolution of strategic conflicts that result from the interaction of different stakeholders that collaborate with different emphases in global supply chains. The approach enables conflicting parties to focus on critical aspects of the conflict resolution process. It identifies the roles of involved decision makers, individual preferences and collective goals, underlying causes of conflict and options to achieve conflict resolution. In other words, it provides bases for cooperation and collaboration between involved parties. In addition, the paper introduces a mathematical tool for conflict resolution based on conflict modeling theories.

Decision supporting tools and port security management systems are developed in the CORE project, but they do not take into consideration possible conflicting goals in the decision-making. The CORE technologies and tools assist to mitigate identified negative threats and their consequences. However, negative effects have a threshold that must be exceeded to make different actors convinced about necessity of mitigation actions and controls. For example, estimated 0.2% annual profit loss due to possible security breach may give or not a reason to risk-profile suppliers or invest in container tracking systems. Especially when the questions are more strategic than operational the related decisions are prone to have conflicting interests. The CORE project does not try to address this problematic.

Reference: Lara Gracia, M. A., & Nof, S. Y. (2009). Conflict resolution in supply chain security. International Journal of Value Chain Management, 3(2), 168–186.

 

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The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations, 2012 (CORE1201)

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Summary: The study creates a supply chain security framework that can be adapted on assessing how security management measures affect on safety and customs clearance performance in container shipping firms. Security management interventions are clustered in four categories: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. Findings indicated that container shipping firms that mainly focus on facility and cargo management and less on partner relationship management are generally more dissatisfied with their company’s customs clearance performance than companies that prioritize partnerships with governmental and commercial companies. The governmental agencies and commercial actors can employ supply chain security management framework, its attributes and dimensions in order to assess the supply chain security performance of container shipping firms.  The reviewed document is available at: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review:  Several authors have clustered supply chain security measures into different categories, but only few authors have provided statistical models to test how well these categories can be used to assess benefits of security measures. The study establishes four security categories/dimensions: facility and cargo management, accident prevention and processing, information management, and partner relationship management. The results imply that partner relationship management is positively related to customs clearance performance. Further, information management and partner relationship management are positively related to safety performance. However, facility and cargo management and accident prevention and processing were not found to have substantial positive impacts on security performance what is controversial to many safety studies. Improved access control, material handling, information processing and reporting of anomalies are clearly factors that are positively related to safety performance based on several work place safety studies. The difference is probably due to questions that defined safety performance: the study addressed accidents and property damages while safety studies measure often near misses and their reporting.

The FP7 CORE project utilizes key performance Indicators (KPIs) to assess and monitor organization’s performance at the operational level. Two CORE KPI’s measure address safety and customs clearance performance, consequently the supply chain security framework can well be adapted on the CORE context. Improved access control, cargo handling, shipping information processing and reporting of anomalies can be measured by using the construct for ‘facility and cargo management’. CORE Training and education can be embedded into the factor ‘accident prevention and processing’ that captures documenting and disseminating of security information. ‘Partner relationship management’ can be tested as a mediating factor that controls how strongly implemented CORE interventions influence on organizational performance indicators in specific demonstrations. Customs agencies can consider using four dimensions of supply chain security as criteria for assessing security performance in container shipping firms. Finally the dimensions and attributes of the framework provide a tool to analyse qualitative data in the project where getting reliable quantitative data is challenging.

Reference: Ching‐Chiao Yang, Hsiao‐Hsuan Wei, “The effect of supply chain security management on security performance in container shipping operations”, Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 18 Iss: 1, pp.74 – 85

 

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Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation, 2009 (CORE1200)

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Summary: Supply chain security culture (SCSC) is as an overall organizational philosophy embracing norms and values that keep employees vigilant when performing supply chain security practices. The article presents a scale that makes possible to gauge supply chain security culture and its correlation to organization’s ability to respond to unexpected disruptions. Employees are asked to assess two topics: security strategy of the company and impacts of significant supply chain breech to business operations. According the study improved supply chain security culture makes company more resilient against major disruptions. This research helps executives to justify their expenditures on security efforts. The reviewed document can be purchased here: http://dx.doi.org.

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Full review: Researchers have stressed the importance of having an organizational culture that highlights proactivity and vigilance toward supply chain security breaches. In security-focused supply chain management environment workers are empowered to detected and handle supply chain security threats without seeking formal permission from supervisors and managers. Company security strategy gives specific attention how SCS concepts are embedded into firm processes and procedures. Alignment with organizational culture and business or corporate-level strategies is believed to result in enhanced organizational performance. In addition, organization culture encompasses supply chain continuity management. The paper presents a scale for measuring supply chain security culture defined as the overall organizational philosophy that creates supply chain security as a priority among its employees through embracing and projecting norms and values to support secure activities and to be vigilant with security efforts.

The study makes possible to assess how implemented FP7-CORE security technologies, tools and practices influence on supply chain resilience based on the perception of company managers and employees. The article gives also guidelines how to develop survey forms and protocols in order to assess the influence of implemented security measures on other KPIs such as supply chain visibility and reliability. The survey tools based on perceived operational and organizational changes complete toolbox to measure impacts of introduced security interventions.

Reference: Zachary Williams, Nicole Ponder, Chad W. Autry, “Supply chain security culture: measure development and validation”, The International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 20 Iss: 2, pp.243 – 260

 

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